|
I. The Problem Historically, presidents have used signing statements to provide reasons for signing a bill, to explain their interpretation of legislative language, or even to express objections to portions of the legislation. More recently, however, the President has increasingly used signing statements to repudiate a wide range of laws -- including those designed to protect basic rights and ensure accountability -- and to indicate that while not vetoing the bills, he will decline to enforce them as written. The President has objected to the constitutionality of hundreds of pieces of legislation based on assertions of unilateral power, such as the “power to supervise the unitary executive,” the “exclusive power over foreign affairs,” and the “authority to determine and impose national security clafssifications and withhold information.” By signing a particular bill into law, but then declaring in a signing statement that he will not give effect to it, the President asserts authority both more robust than the veto -- because it denies Congress an opportunity to override the decision -- and less robust -- because the bill does become law, on the books for future Presidents to enforce and for courts to interpret. Insofar as the President declares an intent not to enforce a portion of the law, and so long as he does not enforce it, he arrogates authority akin to the line item veto that the Supreme Court declared unconstitutional. |
|
Read more...
|
|
|
Assertion of Executive Authority in National Security Matters |
|
I. The Problem In the area of national security, the executive branch’s assertion of executive authority, and “Commander-in-Chief authority” in particular, has extended farther than any time in history and in a manner that inappropriately seeks to evade review. The executive has argued that any presidential action taken in the name of national security is necessarily legal, rejecting congressional and judicial checks and undermining the separation of powers. For example, the President has asserted claims of executive authority to disregard laws enacted by Congress and has used the broadly worded Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) of September 2001 to justify overriding existing laws. |
|
Read more...
|
|
Appendix (Assertion of Executive Authority) |
|
Executive Privilege and Congressional Oversight |
|
I. The Problem When properly invoked, executive privilege is an important tool for protecting Presidential communications and executive branch deliberations. In recent years, however, the President has frequently abused this power by making overbroad privilege assertions and by showing insufficient respect for the interests of Congress. For many years, the Office of Legal Counsel in the Justice Department has recognized that in disputes regarding congressional requests for information, both branches have a constitutional obligation to seek to accommodate the interests of the other insofar as possible. The Administration has scantly honored this obligation in form and has eviscerated it in substance. Among other things, the Administration has claimed, under the cloak of executive privilege, that White House officials have no obligation even to appear in response to properly authorized congressional subpoenas. It has taken the position that Congress has no legitimate interest in investigating Presidential dismissals of his appointees, even if those dismissals are allegedly part of an effort to use criminal law enforcement against political enemies. Still further, when Congress voted these White House officials in criminal contempt for refusing to testify, the Administration has refused to investigate and prosecute the congressional contempt citations, potentially immunizing the executive from appropriate checks on this power. These actions, along with the Administration’s general unwillingness to compromise with Congress and other delaying tactics, have made prompt and effective resolution of these inter-branch disputes illusory. The result has been a weakening of Congress’s ability to fulfill its constitutional oversight responsibilities and a further erosion of our system of checks and balances. |
|
Read more...
|
|
Appendix (Executive Privilege & Congressional Oversight) |
|
Appendix (Signing Statements) |
|
I. The Problem The system of checks and balances on Constitutional war powers authority has eroded. The evolution of the world order and the emergence of serious threats from terrorists have supplied new labels for the ways in which force is used and, in some cases, new justifications for its use. But they have not changed the constitutional dictate that only Congress is empowered to authorize the initiation of the use of force abroad except when force is used for a limited range of defensive purposes. |
|
Read more...
|
|
Appendix (War Powers Authority) |
|
|
|
|
|